The main aim of our paper is to enable communication between the sender and receiver even in the presence of jammer or a malicious node placed between them in the network. Malicious node is one such node that emits high bandwidth signal and high power signals in order to block low power communication signal. Jammers will block particular frequency spectrum used for communication. Since jammer is capable of blocking communication signals we communicate data in the form of time intervals which cannot be blocked. We also analyze the strength and weakness of the jammer. In this paper we are using two equilibria technique which is Nash Equilibria(NEs) and Stackelberg Equilibria(SEs). Keywords-Jammer, Timing channel, Nash Equilibria, Stackelberg Equilibria I. INTRODUCTION A timing channel is a communication channel which exploits silence intervals between consecutive transmissions to encode information. Our focus is on resilience of timing channel to jamming attacks. Continuous emission of high power disturbing signals by jammer will completely disrupt communication in these kinds of attacks. However for the jammer continuous jamming is very costly in terms of energy consumption. In this case as soon as the jammer detects an ongoing transmission activity after continuously listening over the wireless channel, jammer begins the transmission of high power disturbing signal. In this paper we have analyzed the resulting trade of the energy cost of jamming the timing channel. In this paper we analyze the interaction between the jammer and the sender node whose transmission are under attack. The node under attack is known as the target node. Specifically we consider that the target node wants to maximize the amount of information transmitted by the means of timing channel per unit of time, 1) But the jammer wants to minimize such amount of information by reducing the energy expenditure. 2) Since the target node and jammer have conflicting interests we develop a game theoretic framework that models their instructions.We investigate both the cases in which these two adversaries play their strategies simultaneously and situation when the leader node also called as target node will anticipate the action of jammer or follower. For this purpose we study both Nash and Stackelberg Equilibria of our proposed game. The main contribution of this paper is explained as below:
 We model the interaction between a jammer and the target node as a jamming game;  Proves the uniqueness, existence and convergence to the Nash equilibrium under best response dynamics;  We prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the Stackelberg game in which target node plays as a leader and jammer reacts consequently;  We investigate in this latter Stackelberg scenario the impact on the achievable performance of knowledge of jammers utility function;  We conduct an extensive numerical analysis which shows that our proposed models well captures the important factors of the utilization of timing channels, thus providing a framework for designing and understanding of such systems;
II. BACKGROUND WORK The shared and broadcast nature of the wireless medium will expose wireless network to several attacks. The most critical attack is jamming attack. The ongoing communication can partially or totally be disrupted by jamming attacks, in various application scenarios proper solutions have been proposed. Continuous jamming attacks in terms of energy consumption can be really expensive for the jammer as the transmission of jamming signal needs a significant and constant amount of power. Authors show that reactive jamming attacks are feasible and efficient and also low reaction times can be achieved. They also mention the need to investigate proper counter measures against reactive jamming attacks. In order to support low rate energy efficiency and undetectable communications timing channels have been frequently exploited. This is also have been proposed as anti-jamming solutions. Exploiting interarrival times between jammed packets is used to encode information to be transmitted by an antijamming timing channel, this shows how timing channels are suitable to guarantee low rate communication even though a reactive jammer is disrupting transmitted packets. Two constraining assumptions are made, that is i) before performing an attack the jammer has to first recognize the preamble of a packet, and ii) as long as the jammer senses the activity on the channel the jamming signal is sent. As the jammer and target node have opposite interest and actions of the ones depend on those of the others.
III. WORKINGPRINCIPLE
To counteract an ongoing jamming attack the target node will establish a covert channel that exploits the silence period between end of an attack and beginning of the packet transmission. We study both (1) Nash Equilibrium and (2)Stackelberg Equilibrium. Furthermore by comparing the achievable performance of each node we get to know that SE dominates the NE, allowing each player to improve its utility. Even if the continuous jammer has successfully disrupted all the bits contained in a packet the target node is able to transmit covert information. By exploiting the timing channel information it is possible to transmit some data even though jammer has successfully corrupted each packet. 2)Stackelberg Equilibrium: In a Stackelberg Game, one of the players acts as the leader by anticipating the best response to the follower. In our scenario, the jammer plays its strategy when a communication from the destination node is detected on the list channel. Thus it is natural to assume that the target node acts as the leader and the jammer as the follower. So, given the strategy of the target node, the jammer will play the strategy that high its service. This hierarchical structure of the game allows the leader service which is at least equal to utility achieved in the ordinary game at Nash Equilibrium, if we assume perfect knowledge, that is, the destination node is completely aware of the service function of the jammer and its parameters, and thus it is able to evaluate the best response of the jammer. In the case of perfect ability, there is a unique Stackelberg Equilibrium for any value of the weight parameter, and it can be demonstrated that the target node can inhibit the jammer under perfect knowledge assumption.
IV. PROPOSED WORK
Let us consider a scenario where in a network, two wireless nodes one sender and a receiver, are willing to communicate while there exists a malicious node between them which aims at disrupting their communication. Because of this we assume that the malicious node on a wireless channel executes a reactive jamming attack. The jammer senses the wireless channel continuously. When a possible transmission activity performed by target node will be detected by the jammer, the jammer starts emitting the jamming signal. We assume that the target node communicates with the receiver by applying traditional transmission schemes when no attack is performed on the target node; On the other hand when the target node realizes to be under attack, part of the information is transmitted by exploiting the timing channel. The latter is encoded in the duration of time interval between the instant when the jammer J terminates the emission of the jamming signal and the beginning of the transmission of the next packet. Hence, it is possible to consider a discrete time axis and refer to each timing channel utilization by means of an integer index j. The silence period duration scheduled after the j-th packet and the corresponding can be modeled as continuous random variable, Xj, uniformly distributed in the range [ 0,x] . This is consistent with the complete information assumption which is common in game theoretic framework.
V. CONCLUSION
Here, we have analyzed the case of a reactive jammer trying to stop the communication between two nodes in a network. And also tried to optimize the rate of transmission between the two nodes involved in the transmission. Modeling the situation based on Game Theory, we have proved that this scenario can be treated as an example of non-cooperative gaming, and a Nash Equilibrium as well as Stackelberg Equilibrium exist in this competition between the jammer and the communicating node. Using this model, we have proved that it is possible for the target node to communicate with another node even in the presence of the jammer. It ensures that the destination node will receive the packet even in presence of the jammer inside the network.
